Motion to Dismiss

Stockholm District Court
Department 1
B 12885-10: Åklagaren ./. Julian Assange

1. Julian Assange moves that the warrant be immediately withdrawn.

2. Since the arrest matter was last reviewed (by Svea Appeals Court 16 September 2016, supplement 110) the following has transpired:
- Questioning of Assange has been completed.
- The questioning was carried out under unsatisfactory conditions.
- Almost six months have since gone by without anyone being able to see an end to this case.
- The US has now openly declared its intention of arresting and imprisoning Julian Assange.
3. That a questioning of Assange has taken place affects the assessment of whether there's still probable cause.
4. All new events, together with circumstances known previously, lead in any case to the conclusion that the principle of proportionality must now weigh in favour of Julian Assange.

5. Questioning of Julian Assange could finally take place in London 14 and 15 November 2016.
6. The questioning, however, took place in a completely unsatisfactory way, which affects both the evidence evaluation and the assessment of proportionality.
7. The questioning also took place too late, more than six years after the incidents in question which led to the suspicion of crime. Even this strongly affects both the evidentiary evaluation and the assessment of proportionality.
8. Despite these shortcomings, Julian Assange chose to carry on with the questioning. He felt compelled. A strong motive was that Assange wanted to help push the case forward and clear his name.
9. During the questioning Julian Assange submitted a thorough and detailed account of the actual sequence of events between himself and the plaintiff.
10. A new review of the matter of probable cause should therefore be undertaken. The testimony of Julian Assange should be compared to the material the prosecutor has chosen to use as the basis of her motion for arrest, and other known conditions.
11. Such an analysis shows that there is no longer probable cause for the alleged suspicion of crime.

12. Julian Assange assumes this part of the motion will be confidential. The account is therefore submitted in a separate document, see supplement 1.
13. In summary, supplement 1 shows that probable cause no longer exists. The arrest should therefore be withdrawn already for that reason.
14. In any case, it is obvious that the prosecutor can longer count on a conviction. A prosecution will lead to an acquittal. I wish thereby especially to refer to the two very recent precedents which the Supreme Court announced 13 April 2017 regarding evidence evaluation in sex crime cases.
15. That the suspicion of crime has been weakened affects, together with other circumstances, even the assessment of proportionality. In this regard, the following applies:

16. When the questioning was conducted in London, Julian Assange had been at the embassy since 19 June 2012, which had made him ill.
17. From the attached doctor's certificate (should be marked confidential) written immediately prior the questioning (supplement 2) it can be seen that Julian Assange was not in sufficient health to participate in a police questioning. This doctor's certificate was sent to the prosecutor 11 November 2016 via email with the following cover text: Attached sent for your information, a doctor's certificate, sent to Ecuador, showing Julian Assange's current medical condition for Monday's questioning. This certificate may not be made public but shall be marked confidential. Otherwise, reference to the doctor's certificates we've previously submitted to the court. Julian Assange is not cancelling Monday's questioning.
18. I was also denied access to the questioning, but the reason is still not clear. Julian Assange was therefore represented at the hearing by an Ecuadorean attorney, Carlos Poveda, who is newly appointed and not at all familiar with the case. The Swedish prosecution was, however, represented by a Swedish prosecutor and a member of the Swedish police.
19. As I was denied access, I do not know exactly what happened at the questioning. I have, however, been informed that Julian Assange was not served with a formal notification of suspicion of a crime, which in such case is yet another serious shortcoming, see RB 23:18.
20. To shed light on why I was denied access and why, in such case, Julian Assange was not served with a formal notification, I have asked Carlos Poveda to account for what happened at the questioning. Poveda does not speak English but he has sent a statement in Spanish, sworn under oath, to me (supplement 3).
21. After the questioning, the prosecutor did not contact me for almost four months. In the middle of March 2017 I received a document entitled 'Protocol of the Questioning of Julian Assange 14-15 November 2016'. The translation did not include an explanation of why I was denied access.
22. Therefore, on 23 March, I wrote to the prosecutor and included the statement from Carlos Poveda, asking that it be added to the investigation and translated into Swedish, for the sake of clarifying why I was denied access and why Assange was not served with notification.
23. In a letter dated 3 April 2017 Marianne Ny clarified that she has no intention of having Carlos Poveda's statement translated.
24. In a letter dated 6 April 2017 I demanded the Prosecutor-General review that Marianne Ny did not obtain a translation of the statement of Carlos Poveda. The Prosecutor-General has not replied.

25. The status of the preliminary investigation is therefore, from the perspective of the defence, currently the following:
26. The defence challenges whether Assange has been served notice of suspicion according to RB 23:18, and needs to consider the significance of why I was denied access to the questioning, and even that the questioning was conducted despite Assange not being sufficiently in good health to participate in a questioning. This assessment cannot be accomplished until Poveda's statement has been translated. If even the Prosecutor-General will not accede to a translation at the expense of the State Mr Assange himself will pay for the translation.
27. The following shall be added to the above.
28. No 24-18 notification has taken place. As we know, prosecution may not take place until this has happened and until the defence has had reasonable time to prepare.
29. As presented in the confidential supplement to this motion, Julian Assange claims there is no longer probable cause for suspicion of crime. It is the strong opinion of the defence that the prosecutor should immediately close down the preliminary investigation. One cannot, on objective grounds, expect a conviction.
30. But there has been no indication from the prosecutor that she plans to close the case. The only word I have received is that the translation has taken several months and that one now awaits new investigatory procedures.
31. As far as I can see, the prosecutor plans to continue with the investigation. In such case, one must count on the preliminary investigation, given the above, going on for a long time, a matter to be weighed in assessing proportionality.

32. The US has now made it clear that it is its intention to arrest and bring Assange to the US in order to prosecute and imprison him there.
33. The CIA Director Mike Pompeo made a public appearance 13 April 2017 which began with a long speech. A transcript of the complete speech in English is attached (supplement 4). A great part of the speech was directed at WikiLeaks and Julian Assange. My own translation of that part of the speech is attached (supplement 5). In his speech, Mike Pompeo makes the following statements:
- WikiLeaks looks like a hostile intelligence service, sounds like a hostile intelligence service.
- They encouraged Chelsea Manning to steal specific secret information.
- It's time to call WikiLeaks for what it is: a non-state hostile intelligence service.
- There is no doubt that the releases these past years have caused damage, great damage, to the national security of our country, and will continue to do this for a long time to come.
- They've pretended that our first amendment can protect them from justice. They might have thought so, but they are wrong.
- So we pose a decisive question: what can we do about this? What can and what should the CIA, the general intelligence community, the US, and our allies do for this challenge, never before seen, which these hostile non-state intelligence organisations pose?
- We have to realise that we can no longer permit Assange and his colleagues be given the opportunity to exploit freedom of speech against us. To give them this opportunity to crush us would be a perversion of what our constitution stands for. Enough is enough.
34. At a press conference on 20 April 2016 the US Attorney-General Jeff Sessions, in light of Mr Pompeo's speech, answered the following question from a journalist:
'Can you talk about whether it is a priority for your department to arrest Assange once and for all, and whether you think you can take him down?'
Jeff Sessions replied:
'We are going to step up our effort and are already stepping up our efforts on all leaks. This is a matter that has gone beyond anything I'm aware of. We have professionals of the security business that have been in it for many years that are shocked by the number of leaks, and some of them are quite serious. So yes, it is a priority. We have already begun to step up our efforts, and whenever a case can be made, we will seek to put people in jail.'
35. Considering the statements of the US Attorney-General and the Director of the CIA, there can be no remaining doubt that the US has the intention of arresting and imprisoning Julian Assange.
36. In the English media, representatives of British authorities, in light of the actions of the US saying that it will try to get Mr Assange extradited from Great Britain, have stated that they will prioritise an extradition to Sweden rather than a request from the US (according to pertinent English rules).
37. The District Court must therefore assume that Mr Assange - in the event he is forced to leave the embassy - will be sent to Sweden. After that, one can count on the US - in accordance with the statements of Jeff Sessions and the CIA Director - demanding his surrender from Sweden.
38. In that the US made public its intention to arrest and imprison Julian Assange, the question of the arrest warrant comes into a new light. It is no longer possible to dismiss or trivialise the threat from the US. These recent events show that Assange has been right all along. He risks a long prison sentence for his work as a journalist at WikiLeaks. The alleged WikiLeaks source Manning was sentenced to 35 years.
39. The accusations, according to the US media, seem to be about WikiLeaks not only publishing material from their sources, but the US claims that Assange has also acted as an instigator, accomplice, or accessory to the alleged crimes of the sources, as well as Mr Assange helping Edward Snowden escape.
40. At earlier reviews of the arrest warrant issue, the threat of the surrender of Julian Assange has been trivialised or outright dismissed.
41. The Prosecutor-General, regarding the threat of surrender to the US, stated the following to the Supreme Court, supplement 6, page 8, paragraph 1, second last sentence:
'To reach a judgement in this matter it is important, in my opinion, to establish the objective strength in JA's reasons for refusing to appear in Sweden.'
And on page 9, paragraph 1:
'With consideration thereto and when at the current time there is no written request for surrender of JA to the US from Sweden, I believe that JA's reasons for refusing to appear in Sweden, purely objectively, are not of a strength to credit them with any relevance.'
42. The Prosecutor-General stresses that the objective strength of the threats is of decisive importance.
43. The Supreme Court backs the reasoning of the Prosecutor-General (verdict, paragraph 15, final sentence): 'It can be added that no request has been made in Sweden'. The meaning of the Supreme Court verdict is that one believes (see paragraph 15) that Mr Assange - as the US had not demanded his surrender - is obligated to no longer use the protection of his political asylum in exchange for the review that would take place according to Swedish law should Mr Assange be sent to Sweden, whereupon the US demand him surrendered.
44. Even in the motivation section (see paragraph 14) the reasoning of the Prosecutor-General is adopted: 'The Prosecutor-General has, however, explained that there has been no request for surrender to the Department of Justice from the US. Neither has there been anything in the case which hints that the US would be planning such an action.'
45. The objective risk for surrender in the spring of 2015 seems to have been depicted by the Swedish authorities as so low that it could not be 'given any relevance'.
46. The Prosecutor-General, the Supreme Court, and the Secretary of Justice place decisive weight in their judgment on the Prosecutor-General's point that there has been no surrender request from the US.
47. But, judging all aspects, this is a completely irrelevant argument. It is highly unlikely that the US would demand the extradition of someone who is not even in the country. Such a demand would, in addition, judging from previous experience, be dismissed by Sweden without reservation on the grounds that the person sought is not in the country (compare paragraph 53 below). The objective strength in the risk of surrender to the US must be decided by other criteria.
48. Thereto, the decisive significance is that the US now admits that it intends to arrest and imprison Julian Assange. And that, in contrast to the spring of 2015, there is proof of an objective risk that the US will demand Mr Assange's surrender.
49. The analysis of the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court are herewith seen in a totally different light.
50. To use the words of the Prosecutor-General, it is now clear that the objective strength of Julian Assange's reasons to refuse to appear in Sweden is so strong that it must be given relevance. Hereby, the following applies:
51. With his political asylum, Julian Assange has 100% protection from being surrendered to the US, as long as he remains in Ecuador's embassy.
52. A Swedish review of a request from the US to surrender Assange from Sweden does not give him 100% protection. Sweden has, for many years, regularly granted applications from the US for surrender.
53. A review at the end of 2011 showed that Sweden had granted 4 of 6 requests from the US since 2000. The two that were not granted were for people who were not in the country. In practice, Sweden had - at the end of 2011 - granted all requests from the US.
54. Swedish legislation does not provide for any opportunities to render a decision in advance, see the statement of the Prosecutor-General page 8, paragraph 2, final sentence. The legislation, however, has no express hindrance.
55. Mr Assange has, over the years, repeatedly but in vain, attempted to get an advance guarantee from Swedish authorities. If he had been given such a guarantee, he would long ago have come to Sweden.
56. So in practice Sweden's Supreme Court in May 2015 demanded that Assange reject his 100% protection in exchange for a protection that is much lower.
57. In light of the threat from the US which can today be proven, the reasoning of Sweden's Supreme Court is clearly untenable.
58. As the US wants to arrest Assange, one must assume that the US will demand his surrender if he is sent to Sweden from Great Britain. The US cannot effect his surrender directly from Great Britain as, according to English law, a surrender to Sweden comes first. A request from the US would thereafter be reviewed according to Swedish law.
59. It is now - in light of the clear and present threat from the US - unreasonable of Sweden to demand that Mr Assange exchange a 100% protection for a judicial review that historically has meant surrender to the US.
60. In summary, it is now proven that objectively there is a great risk that the US will demand his surrender if he is sent to Sweden from Great Britain.
61. There is also a risk that he will really be extradited to the US if he leaves the embassy and thereby loses his political asylum to instead submit to Swedish law regarding surrender.
62. Julian Assange is therefore forced to continue to use his political asylum as it is the only safe way to protect himself from surrender to the US, where he risks many years in prison for his work as a journalist for WikiLeaks.
63. This conclusion is of great significance for various aspects of a review of proportionality. Hereby, the following applies:

64. That the threat of surrender to the US is now proven has, firstly, great significance for the question whether there exists a long-term hinderance to executing the warrant.
65. One has to assess how the case will be handled in the future, in the event the preliminary investigation continues and leads to court.
66. It is clear this must weigh in on the assessment of proportionality, see NJA 2015, page 261, paragraph 11. The significance of the Supreme Court's reference to the doctrine is the following: a means of coercion shall cease when it proves to be without result. The coercion must be both necessary to achieve the desired goal and truly lead to this goal being achieved. Further, one must stop using coercion if it does not lead to the desired result.
67. The arrest cannot be executed for the foreseeable future because Mr Assange is forced to use his political asylum. Mr Assange has objective reasons for this. An arrest that cannot be executed must be rescinded, at least when the person sought has strong objective reasons to refuse to appear, which Mr Assange definitely has.
68. The Supreme Court pointed out, however, in its verdict (paragraph 11) that difficulties in executing a warrant must be weighed against the public interest in investigating the crime, and it concludes, in paragraph 13, that 'criminality of the type in this allegation is such that there is a strong public interest that it be investigated'.
69. Even this argument has come into a new light since Mr Assange has been questioned. As is seen from the secret part of this motion, there is no longer, in the opinion of the defence, probable cause for the suspicion. Under all circumstances, the suspicion has been seriously weakened in light of his account of events with the plaintiff. By virtue of the questioning, the suspicion of crime has been, in all relevant aspects, investigated. There is no longer such a strong public interest to investigate the case that a long-term arrest is necessary. In any case, the remainder of the investigation can be carried out without an arrest, which in such case it should be observed that there is no way to force Mr Assange to Sweden for a trial as long as he is forced to use his political asylum, which he - as shown above - has strong objective reasons to do.
70. The only effect of a continued arrest is that Mr Assange can only use his political asylum inside the embassy. If the arrest is withdrawn, he can travel to Ecuador and use his political asylum in an entire country, something which would improve his life in a decisive way.
71. It is important to point out the obvious - namely that rescinding the warrant does in no way mean that the preliminary investigation is closed.
72. That Mr Assange can now prove that he has strong objective reasons to use his political asylum is of decisive importance even for the fact that he is considered 'arbitrarily detained' (which the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded) or if he can 'voluntarily' leave the embassy, which the Swedish courts concluded. Even this matter is ultimately decided by the objective strength of the threat of surrender to the US. Hereby, the following applies:

73. Julian Assange submitted a doctor's certificate to the District Court in March 2016 (supplement 83). He gave the Svea Court of Appeals a further medical certificate, drawn up in June 2016 (supplement 7). His living conditions and medical status are the same or worse today.
74. Supplement 83 shows that Mr Assange's living conditions are the following: he lacks the ability to go outdoors. The embassy lacks a courtyard and garden. There is no direct sunlight indoors. Mr Assange's bedroom is 5.5 m2 and has room for a single bed and a small wardrobe. There is no room for a chair or desk. He has shared access to another room, approximately 25 m2. It is here that Mr Assange works and eats. The curtains are always drawn to prevent people from looking in. The continual police surveillance is visible from every angle and has been a continual reminder that he is under siege from the authorities. The surveillance cameras run round the clock. In the following regard Mr Assange's situation at the embassy is worse than in an ordinary prison: he does not have access to adequate medical care, he cannot be outdoors without losing the protection he has had, and it is impossible to know how long this situation will stand.
75. This situation has been ongoing since 19 June 2012 - almost five years.
76. This situation is caused by attempts to execute the European Arrest Warrant, which in turn is issued on the basis of the arrest. There is a condition of causality between the arrest and Mr Assange's living conditions.
77. As regards Mr Assange's mental health, the following is found in supplement 83 (pages 22 and following):
'Mr Assange's mental health is highly likely to deteriorate over time if he remains in his current situation. Such highly stressful circumstances, with no end in sight, can lead to unpredictable and sometimes very destructive consequences for individuals. They may become very ill mentally and physically and carry out desperate acts to try and gain relief. It is urgent that his current circumstances are resolved as quickly as possible. At a minimum, it is recommended that his urgent medical complaints regarding the pain in his shoulder be investigated with appropriate equipment; and the dental surgery that has been prescribed be performed. The Embassy is not a medical setting. The only way Mr Assange can access either urgent medical care or investigations would be to place himself in the hands of the British authorities. Mr Assange is in an invidious position of having to decide between his physical health and the risk of being extradited to the United States. His inability to access proper medical care and assessment - without placing himself into the hands of the authorities - transforms each physical complaint no matter how simple into something that could have catastrophic consequences either for his health or his liberty. He lives in a state of chronic health insecurity. Mr Assange needs - at the bare minimum - access to fresh air, sunlight and exercise space on a daily basis. Mr Assange has been living under very restrictive conditions for over forty months. The unusual circumstances place Mr Assange in a precarious situation. The effects of the situation on Mr Assange's health and well-being are serious and the risks will most certainly escalate with the potential to becoming life-threatening if current conditions persist.'
78. From the cited part of the medical certificate it can be seen that Mr Assange is in acute need of medical treatment for two physical ailments: pain in his shoulder, and toothache.
79. Svea Court of Appeals, in its decision of 16 September 2016 (supplement 110), accepted the description of Mr Assange's living conditions and his physical and mental status, see ruling, page 5.
80. Mr Assange presumes the District Court will do the same. He has therefore not requested new medical certificates.

81. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) announced in its decision of 22 January 2016 (supplement 82) that Julian Assange is arbitrarily detained.
82. The UNWGAD therefore told Sweden to swiftly remedy the situation so Julian Assange got back his liberty (ruling, paragraph 100).
83. Great Britain asked the UNWGAD to reconsider its ruling, but this did not lead to any change. Sweden did not even appeal. The ruling of the UNWGAD stands.
84. Sweden has not yet, after nearly one-and-a-half years, acted on the ruling of the UNWGAD.
85. Sweden has a duty under the rule of law to carry out the ruling of the UNWGAD.
86. In this particular case, the responsibility lies with the prosecutor, as well as by extension the courts that deal with the detention issue.
87. That this is the case is due to the prohibition against ministerial rule, see supplement 101, paragraphs 22-27. I wish to especially refer to the three legal cases from the Supreme Court mentioned in paragraph 27 in supplement 101.
88. These legal cases show very clearly that it is the responsibility of the prosecutor and, by extension, the courts to implement the principle of proportionality in accordance with Sweden's legal responsibilities.
89. At the most recent review in the Svea Court of Appeals, this viewpoint was in principle accepted, see the court's ruling, page 5, paragraph 2 (supplement 110).
90. That the Court of Appeals, despite this, did not obey the ruling of the UNWGAD and rescind the warrant was because the court used the same view of the risk for surrender to the US used by the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court, ie that the objective risk for surrender to the US was so insignificant that Mr Assange could leave the embassy.
91. So they arrived at the conclusion that Mr Assange was not arbitrarily detained but instead lived at the embassy voluntarily.
92. As shown above, we are in a new situation. Mr Assange can now prove that there is an objective risk of surrender to the US. According to the reasoning of the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court, Mr Assange therefore has reason to use his political asylum. He cannot leave the embassy, for then there will be an objective risk that he is surrendered to the US.
93. Mr Assange is therefore arbitrarily detained. One can no longer claim that he lives at the embassy 'voluntarily'.
94. It is therefore incumbent on the District Court to follow, not only for formal rule-of-law reasons but also for material reasons (the objective risk for surrender is now proven), the admonition of the UNWGAD and immediately free Mr Assange.

95. The conditions under which Mr Assange lives inside the embassy also constitute a deprivation of liberty according to case law from the European Court. (See the European Court's ruling of 25 June 1996 in Amuur v France (case 17/1995/523/609); ruling of 6 November 1980 in Guzzardi v Italy (1980, Series 8 Number 39); and ruling of 9 April 2013 in Abdi v Great Britain (application 27770/08).
96. Mr Assange does not elaborate further here but refers to the part of the aforementioned supplements, see the appeal of 12 September 2014 to the Svea Court of Appeals (supplement 62) and motion of 17 October 2014 to the Svea Court of Appeals (supplement 8).
97. With earlier reviews (see, for example, the deliberation in NJA 2015, page 261, paragraphs 11-13) Mr Assange's claim that he should be regarded as deprived of liberty according to European law was dismissed with the same reasoning: the threat of surrender to the US is so remote that Mr Assange is to be regarded as living in the embassy 'voluntarily'.
98. Even the European legal analysis comes into a new light by virtue of it now being proven that the US intends to arrest and imprison Mr Assange. He must therefore be regarded as deprived of liberty by European law.

99. A new proportionality assessment as of today's date shall, in summary, take into consideration at least the following circumstances:
a. Julian Assange was deprived of liberty in Great Britain during 7-16 December 2010.
b. Julian Assange had between 16 December 2010 and 19 June 2012 restrictions in the form of electronic surveillance with an ankle bracelet, a duty to report daily to the police, and not being allowed to be outside his residence at specific times.
c. Until 13 March 2015, the prosecutor refused to question Mr Assange. This meant that the questioning of Julian Assange was first conducted on 14-15 November 2016, more than six years after the alleged incident.
d. Mr Assange's defence has suffered irreversible damage because of this delay. His testimony has been negatively affected. Memory fades with time. He can never get a fair trial. The plaintiff and her oral evidentiary support have been heard in close proximity to the incident; the plaintiff has been heard many times.
e. The questioning was conducted under unsatisfactory conditions: Julian Assange was not sufficiently healthy to participate in a police questioning, I was denied access to my client, and it is unclear whether Julian Assange was served with the notice of suspicion.
f. The preliminary investigation would seem to be continuing for a long time. No 23:18 serving of notice has taken place despite almost seven years having passed. No indication is given whether the prosecutor intends to close the preliminary investigation.
g. Julian Assange has resided at the Ecuador embassy in London since 19 June 2012 under difficult living conditions, which have resulted in physical and mental illness.
h. It is now established that there is a tangible risk that the US will apply to have Mr Assange surrendered from Sweden. In such case, there is a risk that Sweden will surrender him to the US where he risks a long prison sentence for his work as a journalist for WikiLeaks. Mr Assange is therefore justified in using his political asylum. He has objective reasons to 'refuse to appear in Sweden'. His residence at the embassy, his living conditions, and his physical and mental health should therefore be taken into consideration when assessing proportionality. The view that he can 'voluntarily' leave the embassy is no longer valid. He is to be regarded as arbitrarily detained according to the ruling of the UNWGAD and deprived of liberty according to the case law of the European Court.
i. The arrest cannot be executed for the foreseeable future. Therefore it has no effect and shall be rescinded (Supreme Court ruling, paragraph 11, with its reference to the doctrine).
j. There is no longer a strong public interest to investigate the alleged crime because the investigation after the questioning of Assange is in all regards completed and because the suspicions have been seriously weakened.

100. In summation I should like to cite the following:
a. A member of the Supreme Court wanted to rescind the warrant already two years ago. He said especially that 'it's been unclear for a long time when an extradition to Sweden will take place'.
b. It is now established that an extradition cannot take place for the foreseeable future. In addition, two more years have passed. It is therefore obvious that the warrant must be rescinded.
c. Even the Secretary of Justice suggested in the deliberation that the warrant be rescinded.
d. The majority of the Supreme Court also stressed that the time factor was decisive. In the ruling, paragraph 18, it is said that 'this has taken a long time'. In paragraph 19 it is stressed that 'there are therefore no reasons to cancel the ruling'.
e. Even the Svea Court of Appeals was of the same line of thought in its most recent ruling (supplement 100): it says: 'the long time for this arrest must be weighed into the assessment of proportionality'. The court concluded its ruling by pointing out that the arrest still seemed effective 'as a way to achieve a questioning of Assange'. The questioning has now taken place and the arrest should therefore now be withdrawn.
f. As shown above, several new factors have occurred after the previous reviews, most importantly Mr Assange has been questioned and the threat from the US has manifested in a definitive decision from US authorities that it is its intent to arrest Mr Assange and put him in prison.
g. An extradition to Sweden can therefore not take place for the foreseeable future.
h. The statute of limitations, should charges not be brought, expires 17 August 2020. Should charges be brought, the statute is extended to 30 years according to BrB35:6 paragraph 3.
i. It is obvious that Swedish authorities do not have the right to detain Mr Assange until 17 August 2040!
j. Everything points to the time being right to now withdraw the arrest of Julian Assange.

'Stockholm som ovan'

Per E Samuelson

Theme by Danetsoft and Danang Probo Sayekti inspired by Maksimer