Analysis of unedited cable: 2011-03-18 Bulgarian Organized Crime Uncensored
2011-03-19 Bulgarian "Criminal Radiation" Leaks from Unedited Wikileaks Cable
Bulgarian translation of both articles here.
UPDATE: The Wikileaks site has now been updated with the uncensored version of the 05SOFIA1207 cable. The full text scores 5226 words compared to the 1406 words in the Guardian redacted version published on December 1 2010. The redactions are shown clearly here (thanks to commenter rhill for pointing it out). The parts that were redacted are green.
At the end of November, 2010, Wikileaks triggered the Cablegate scandal: the release of 251 287 secret American diplomatic cables. Currently, the site has published 5 000 cables or about 2% of the entire database. Eight of them are from the American Embassy in Sofia.
The Wikileaks site has a total of 978 diplomatic cables from the US Embassy in Sofia. There are another 66 cables with the tag Bulgaria.
On December 1, 2010, The Guardian published on its site the diplomatic cable of the American Embassy in Sofia dedicated to organized crime in Bulgaria.
On December 7, 2010, Le Monde published an overview about the influence of Russian mafia in Europe, also citing the cable, signed by then Ambassador to Sofia, James Pardew.
From the Le Monde article we learn that there is another cable, dated September 11, 2009, also focusing on the Bulgarian organized crime. It has a section titled “Russian Influence,” commenting on the representative of Michael Chorny in Bulgaria – attorney, Todor Batkov. The Embassy stresses on his solid political connections and the fact he has been awarded in 2008 by President, Georgi Parvanov, with the country’s highest order “Stara Planina.”
Ten days after the Le Monde publication, on December 17, 2010, the Wikileaks site published the Guardian-censored version of the text of the diplomatic cable from July 7, 2005, signed by Ambassador James Pardew.
The text of the September 2009, cable never saw daylight and currently only journalists from the publications, accredited by Wikileaks, know about it and its content.
In the published cable from July 7, 2005, the section “Who Is Who in Bulgarian Organized Crime” abounds with censored paragraphs. We can only guess the reason of the Guardian journalists to conceal individuals and businesses the Embassy believes are part of organized crime. The names of these individuals and businesses, along with information about alleged ties with organized crime, are nothing new for the Bulgarian and international audience.
Bivol.bg, a bulgarian investigative journalism web site received the uncensored text of James Pardew’s cable, dated July 7, 2005. It was provided by the magazine “Russkiy Reporter” (Russian Reporter), which is preparing a publication about the influence of Russian mafia in Bulgaria. The magazine asked us to verify the authenticity of the names and the events, and to prepare comments on the faith of the emblematic organized crime bosses, cited in the cable.
We must note that we have no contract or financial relations with “Russkiy Reporter,” its owners and its sources of information. Our professional contacts end with the work on this particular case: summarizing and offering factual information and our editorial analysis of the cable.
The cable’s authenticity was confirmed by another source – the Norwegian paper Aftenposten, which has independent access to all diplomatic cables leaked through Wikileaks.
We examined in detail the entire text and did not find in it a single name of a person that must be concealed for safety reasons, because they have provided information about organized crime to the American Embassy.
The cable quotes concrete names of individuals and companies, which still own and manage significant assets in Bulgaria. It examines the symbiosis of crime and power by the financing of election campaigns.
The cable further notes the trend of individuals coming from the organized crime circles to directly enter national-level politics or to directly control local power. A trend that, as we all know, became more and more pronounced in the years to follow.
The cable stresses on the legacy of the criminal Communist repressive apparatus for the figures of Bulgarian organized crime. In the beginning of the transition period, in addition to the now-notorious wrestlers, rowers and other sports competitors from the Communists training schools, former “blades” of the repressive system also entered organized crime groups – berets, navy seals and other special task forces, brought up and trained not to fight some external enemy, but to safeguard the favorites of the regime from the anger of the Bulgarian people.
The economic influence of individuals, listed in the cable as having ties with organized crime, continued to expand over the year with the active collaboration of the State, which in reality subsidized their business.
The notorious saying that “in Bulgaria the mafia has a State,” becomes alive by what Ambassador Pardew has written. The Ambassador bitterly notes the society’s frustration from its helpless situation. Pardew believes the tools of influence of the EU are crucial. “If the EU uses this leverage to demand not only far-reaching judicial reform but effective implementation as well, there is reason to hope that the tide will slowly begin to turn against organized crime in the coming years,” the Ambassador concludes.
Hellas, it becomes more and more clear, the citizens in this dead-lock cannot count on an effective external interference.
There is lots of talk about pressure to fight organized crime, but at the same time, politicians with ties to DS (Communist State Security) and OC (Organized Crime) are serving as Members of the European Parliament while leading European companies do business with firms managed by people intelligence services suspect of criminal deals.
The full cable text is published here.
The full text scores 5226 words, compared to the 1406 words in the Guardian redacted version published on December 1 2010.
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The process our writers went
The process our writers went through in publishing information from the cables, was to write articles drawing attention to e.g. the Russian criminal mafia. We did this to such an extent that our Moscow correspondent, Luke Harding, was thrown out with his family. We also published the text of supporting cables where we were able to: these were vetted by our libel lawyers, and where there were allegations against individuals that couldn't be proved, these had to be redacted. The Guardian can be sued for what it publishes in the UK. WIkileaks on the other hand, can publish what it likes. We're not stopping them. It's a fair point that we could, and perhaps should, have explained all this. But no-one at the Guardian imagined we were going to be accused of conspiring with Bulgarian organised crime!
Protecting, not conspiring
David, you are tampering with the text again. In the article I believe you are referring to, The Guardian: Redacting, censoring or lying? no one accused you of "conspiring with Bulgarian organised crime" you were accused of "apparently protecting the Bulgarian mafia", and, willfully or no, that has been the result of the Guardian's actions in this case. Anyone reading your version of the cable is left with the absolute impression that this, in the eyes of the world's most sophisticated intelligence gathering country, is the extent of Bulgarian organised crime.
I would also really like to know why your lawyers felt that the Bulgarians were a libel risk but not the Russians? And Atanas' excellent question also deserves an answer. And your readers deserve to know, at the very least, what you have redacted, why you have redacted it and where you have redacted it.
As to Wikileaks being able to publish what it likes, so can the Guardian if they, like Wikileaks, are willing to suffer the consequences. True journalism has never been for the faint of heart.
Libel laws and WL information
It is interesting to know, that the Cablegate leaks are biased by the libel laws of UK, France, Spain and Germany.
Take this Sofia cable:
1. The Guardian hided the name of Todor Batkov, the Michael Chorny lawyer http://bg.gl/26
2. But Le Monde published it: http://bg.gl/2a
Same did El Pais in another cable related to corruption in bulgarian soccer: http://bg.gl/2b
And in this cable published by The Guardian you can even see the name of an informant of the US Embassy, Bisser Boev:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/215404
So I'm a bit confused.
Professional advantage vs Public interest
Dear David,
As I wrote in my article: "We can only guess the reason of the Guardian journalists to conceal individuals and businesses the Embassy believes are part of organized crime." Thank you for clearing this point. We also consult our libel lawyer and we know what we are risking under bulgarian law.
In the extended version of my article I wrote the following:
"It will be real pity if it turns out journalists from reputed international media use information, provided by Wikileaks as merchandise, whose value depends on the selection of the precise moment to offer it on the market."
So nobody is accusing you of conspiring with Bulgarian organized crime. Instead, there are reasons to believe that Guardian and the other mainstream media, having access to the WL cache, can use exclusively the information hidden from the public, following their own agenda.
Take the example with Petr Smolar, a journalist from Le Monde, who wrote on the same topics, but NEVER published the corresponding Wikileaks cable from Sofia, dated September 11, 2009
Two monts later as a special envoy of the Le Monde, Petr Smolar emerged in Sofia and wrote an extensive article about the conflict between the "public ennemy N°1" Alexei Petrov (his name is in the redacted Sofia cable) and Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, with details about a big wiretap scandal.
Clearly, in such a case, a journalist from Figaro or Liberation, or whatever, will have less information then the journalist from Le Monde, isn't it?
So does the professional advantage is more important then the need of transparency and the public interest to expose the criminal activities?
Thank you for discussing this and excuse my English.
The Guardian doesn't have any
The Guardian doesn't have any earthly reason to protect the Bulgarian mafia from exposure. The process our writers went through in publishing information from the cables, was to write articles drawing attention to e.g. the Russian criminal mafia. We did this to such an extent that our Moscow correspondent, Luke Harding, was thrown out with his family. We also published the text of supporting cables where we were able to: these were vetted by our libel lawyers, and where there were allegations against individuals that couldn't be proved, these had to be redacted. The Guardian can be sued for what it publishes in the UK. WIkileaks on the other hand, can publish what it likes. We're not stopping them. It's a fair point that we could, and perhaps should, have explained all this. But no-one at the Guardian imagined we were going to be accused of conspiring with Bulgarian organised crime!